How can people who do not rely on effective government institutions establish property rights, enforce agreements, and facilitate social and economic exchange? Scholars of public choice have long studied anarchic settings to understand foundational questions of political economy, such as the viability and robustness of self-enforcing exchange, the emergence of coercive power, and the Madisonian challenge of self-enforcing constraints. Recent work turns this conceptual, theoretical, and empirical work to the topic of the underground economy and criminal governance. Because of its illicit nature, people involved in criminal activity cannot rely on legitimate, state-based legal institutions. In this absence, a wide range of criminal governance institutions and organizations have emerged to facilitate illicit activity. Based on studies of California prison gangs, I show how classic public choice approaches explain why incarcerated people need extralegal governance, survey some of the internal governance solutions they rely on, and demonstrate how and why they govern, not only themselves, but thousands of people inside and outside of prison.

不依赖有效政府机构的人们如何建立产权、执行协议并促进社会和经济交流？公共选择学者长期以来一直在研究无政府主义环境，以理解政治经济学的基本问题，例如自我执行交换的可行性和稳健性、强制权力的出现以及麦迪逊对自我执行约束的挑战。最近的工作将这一概念、理论和实证工作转向地下经济和犯罪治理的主题。由于其非法性质，参与犯罪活动的人不能依赖合法的、以国家为基础的法律机构。在这种情况下，出现了各种犯罪治理机构和组织来为非法活动提供便利。基于对加州监狱帮派的研究，我展示了经典的公共选择方法如何解释为什么被监禁的人需要法外治理，调查他们依赖的一些内部治理解决方案，并展示他们如何以及为什么管理，不仅是他们自己，而且是成千上万的人监狱内外。