Avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’ remains a challenge in many natural resource systems, and open-access fisheries are well-studied in this context. Here, an agent-based model is used to investigate how variation in fisher goals change what policies best solve the tragedy. When fishers’ goals are easily satisfied, commons problems are avoided without management interventions, but the imposition of quota limits triggers the tragedy. Thus, commons problems are not necessarily inevitable and sophisticated governance institutions or regulations are not always required to manage them; the same policy may prevent the tragedy or trigger it, depending on the fisher's goals. Given that it is difficult to ascertain them, by using a simulation model we can find patterns that help us identify fishers' goals and incorporate these patterns within our management procedure. This can assist adaptive management to better incorporate behaviour into policy evaluation.

中文翻译：

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引发悲剧：替代渔民目标对海洋渔业和渔业政策的模拟影响

避免“公地悲剧”仍然是许多自然资源系统中的一个挑战，开放式渔业在这方面得到了充分研究。在这里，基于代理的模型用于研究渔民目标的变化如何改变最能解决悲剧的政策。当渔民的目标很容易满足时，公地问题就可以避免，无需管理干预，但实行配额限制却引发了悲剧。因此，公地问题并不一定是不可避免的，也并不总是需要复杂的治理机构或法规来管理它们；同样的政策可能会防止悲剧发生，也可能引发悲剧，这取决于渔民的目标。鉴于很难确定它们，通过使用模拟模型，我们可以找到帮助我们识别渔民目标的模式，并将这些模式纳入我们的管理程序中。这可以帮助适应性管理更好地将行为纳入政策评估。