We study optimal information disclosure via an ambiguous persuasion approach in a two-player contest. The designer can precommit to an ambiguous device to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about his opponent's private type. We fully characterize the optimal ambiguous information structures when players are maxmin expected utility (MMEU) maximizers. Depending on the prior, it is optimal to either induce ambiguity or fully conceal information. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which an effort-maximizing organizer can benefit strictly more from using ambiguous persuasion than from using the optimal Bayesian device.

中文翻译：

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竞赛中模棱两可的说服

我们在两人竞赛中通过模糊说服方法研究最佳信息披露。设计者可以预先采取一种模糊的手段来影响不知情的参赛者对其对手私人类型的看法。当玩家是最大最小预期效用（MMEU）最大化者时，我们充分描述了最佳模糊信息结构。根据先验，最好是引起歧义或完全隐藏信息。我们提供了一个充分必要条件，在该条件下，努力最大化的组织者可以从使用模糊说服中获得比使用最佳贝叶斯设备更多的收益。