Exploiting the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as an exogenous shock that resulted in a significant decline in the ownership of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in the Indian equity market, we find evidence of a causal link between FIIs’ ownership and different dimensions of board monitoring. Specifically, the empirical results suggest that higher FIIs ownership leads to lower board size, busyness, network size, CEO power, CEO pay, and improved board diligence. However, we also document a negative link between FIIs’ ownership and board independence, indicating that FIIs do not view independent directors as effective monitors. In terms of implications, our results suggest that improved board monitoring, induced by higher FIIs’ ownership, leads to higher firm valuation and innovation activities.

中文翻译：

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外国机构投资者是否改善了董事会监管？

利用 2007-08 年全球金融危机作为导致印度股票市场外国机构投资者 (FII) 所有权大幅下降的外生冲击，我们发现了 FII 所有权与不同维度的因果关系之间存在因果关系的证据。董事会监控。具体而言，实证结果表明，较高的境外机构投资者所有权会导致董事会规模、繁忙度、网络规模、首席执行官权力、首席执行官薪酬的降低以及董事会勤勉度的提高。然而，我们也记录了境外机构投资者的所有权与董事会独立性之间的负相关关系，这表明境外机构投资者并不将独立董事视为有效的监督者。就影响而言，我们的研究结果表明，由于境外机构投资者的所有权增加，董事会监督的改善会带来更高的公司估值和创新活动。