Problem definition: For many information goods, longer publication cycles (or batches of information) are more economical, but often result in less timely—and, therefore, less valuable—information. Whereas the digitalization of publication processes has reduced fixed publication costs, making shorter publication cycles more economically viable, competing firms have adapted their publication cycles differently: some of them publish more frequently, whereas others publish less frequently. In the face of growing competition and digitalization, how should information providers change their publication frequency strategies? Methodology/results: In this paper, we build a game-theoretic model to determine how information providers should set their publication cycles and prices in a duopoly. We find that, compared with a monopolistic environment, competition gives rise to differentiation by cycles and expands product variety. Specifically, competing firms should seek to differentiate on their publication frequency when the fixed publication is high and their contents share a high degree of commonality, but not otherwise. Whereas a reduction in the fixed cost of publication tends to yield shorter publication cycles, it could also intensify the competitive dynamics, leading firms to further differentiate their publication cycles, hurting consumer surplus. However, this could be temporary, as firms may ultimately converge in their choices of publication cycles. Managerial implications: The digitalization of publication processes is disrupting many information provision industries (e.g., news, weather, financial). We show that competing firms should anticipate nonmonotone or abrupt changes in their publication strategy as their publication processes get digitalized and may actually be hurt—as well as consumers—in the process of digitalization.Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0024 .

中文翻译：

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快还是慢？竞争出版频率

问题定义：对于许多信息产品来说，较长的发布周期（或批量信息）更经济，但通常会导致信息不及时，因此价值较低。尽管出版流程的数字化降低了固定出版成本，使较短的出版周期在经济上更加可行，但竞争公司却以不同的方式调整了出版周期：其中一些公司出版更频繁，而另一些公司出版频率较低。面对日益激烈的竞争和数字化，信息提供商应如何改变发布频率策略？方法/结果：在本文中，我们构建了一个博弈论模型来确定信息提供商应如何在双头垄断中设定其出版周期和价格。我们发现，与垄断环境相比，竞争会周期性地产生差异化，扩大产品种类。具体而言，当固定出版物较高且其内容具有高度共性时，竞争公司应寻求在其出版频率上实现差异化，否则则不然。尽管出版固定成本的降低往往会缩短出版周期，但它也可能加剧竞争动态，导致企业进一步区分其出版周期，从而损害消费者剩余。然而，这可能是暂时的，因为公司最终可能会在出版周期的选择上趋于一致。管理影响：出版流程的数字化正在扰乱许多信息提供行业（例如新闻、天气、金融）。我们表明，随着出版流程数字化，竞争公司应该预见到其出版策略的非单调或突然变化，并且在数字化过程中实际上可能会受到伤害——以及消费者。补充材料：电子伴侣可在以下网址获得：https： //doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0024 。