We examine how differences in the career incentives of female directors impact their monitoring effectiveness in the context of financial reporting. We find that female independent directors who are sitting senior executives in other firms (executive FIDs) improve financial reporting quality while other female independent directors (non-executive FIDs) do not. Exogenous departure of executive FIDs leads to deterioration of financial reporting quality. Empirical approaches addressing reverse causality and selection problems support our primary findings. We also find that executive FIDs who are younger or not CEOs are more effective in improving financial reporting quality. These findings support the notion that varying career incentives of female directors contribute to the differences in their board monitoring performance. Finally, executive FIDs’ effective monitoring of financial reporting is more prominent in firms with higher monitoring costs and when they serve on more prestigious boards.

中文翻译：

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所有女导演都是平等的吗？女性独立董事的激励和有效性

我们研究了女性董事的职业激励差异如何影响其在财务报告背景下的监控有效性。我们发现，担任其他公司高级管理人员的女性独立董事（执行 FID）提高了财务报告质量，而其他女性独立董事（非执行 FID）则没有。高管 FID 的外源性离职导致财务报告质量恶化。解决反向因果关系和选择问题的经验方法支持我们的主要发现。我们还发现，年轻的高管 FID 或非首席执行官在提高财务报告质量方面更有效。这些发现支持这样一种观点，即女性董事不同的职业激励因素导致了董事会监督绩效的差异。最后，高管 FID 对财务报告的有效监控在监控成本较高的公司以及在更有声望的董事会任职时更为突出。