This paper explores a two‐population evolutionary game that models the role of manufacturer regulation as a motivation to auto parts quality certification. In particular, we assume that auto parts suppliers can choose whether or not to obtain the certification, ensuring a relatively high quality of the products, and manufactures can choose whether or not to engage in regulation for certification facilitation, influencing the suppliers' incentive to avoid punishment of uncertificated products. We study the Nash equilibria of this game and conduct static and dynamic evolutionary analyses. The research shows that reducing the auto parts suppliers' certification cost, increasing the penalty cost of the supplier who provides the auto parts that are not certified, and distributing the risk‐loss proportion of manufacturer and supplier properly can encourage auto parts suppliers to obtain the quality certification.

中文翻译：

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汽车零部件质量认证与制造商监管：演化博弈论视角

本文探讨了一种双群体进化博弈，该博弈模拟了制造商监管作为汽车零部件质量认证动机的作用。特别是，我们假设汽车零部件供应商可以选择是否获得认证，保证产品的较高质量，而制造商可以选择是否进行认证便利化监管，影响供应商避免认证的动机。对未经认证产品的处罚。我们研究该博弈的纳什均衡并进行静态和动态演化分析。研究表明，降低汽车零部件供应商的认证成本、提高对提供未通过认证的汽车零部件的供应商的处罚成本、合理分配制造商和供应商的风险损失比例，可以鼓励汽车零部件供应商获得认证。质量认证。