To improve the problem of environmental pollution liability insurance, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on the government, insurance companies, and polluting enterprises. The findings indicate that in an imperfect market, penalty and subsidy mechanisms boost insurance rates. Reinsurance facilitates insurer underwriting, prompting gradual government withdrawal. Effective pricing mechanisms by insurance companies enhance environmental liability insurance operations amid evolving market mechanisms, offering theoretical guidance for addressing challenges in implementing such insurance.

中文翻译：

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基于演化博弈的环境污染责任保险多主体协同开发策略

针对环境污染责任保险问题，构建了基于政府、保险公司、污染企业的演化博弈模型。研究结果表明，在不完善的市场中，惩罚和补贴机制会提高保险费率。再保险促进保险公司承保，促使政府逐步退出。保险公司有效的定价机制增强了环境责任保险在不断变化的市场机制中的运作，为解决环境责任保险实施中的挑战提供了理论指导。