This article develops an interpretation and defense of Husserl’s account of the omnitemporality of idealities. I first examine why Husserl rejects the atemporality and temporal individuation of idealities on phenomenological grounds, specifically that these attributions prove countersensical in how they relate idealities to consciousness. As an alternative to these conceptions, I develop a two-sided interpretation of omnitemporality expressed in modal terms of actuality and possibility; the actual referring to appearances in time and the possible, to reactivation at any time, on phenomenological grounds. In defense of this interpretation of omnitemporality, I consider influential criticisms against Husserl’s account of idealities as they concern time, particularly whether the historical genesis of idealities compromises their omnitemporality by binding them to time. Ultimately, I argue that the transcendental historicity of idealities, despite being relevant to the question of validity and access, proves indifferent to their omnitemporality.

本文对胡塞尔对理想的全时间性的解释进行了解释和辩护。我首先考察为什么胡塞尔在现象学的基础上拒绝理想性的非时间性和时间个体化，特别是这些归因在如何将理想性与意识联系起来方面被证明是反意义的。作为这些概念的替代方案，我对全时性提出了一种以现实性和可能性的模态术语表达的双向解释。实际指的是时间上的出现，而可能指的是在现象学的基础上随时重新激活。为了捍卫这种对全时间性的解释，我考虑了对胡塞尔对理想性的解释的有影响力的批评，因为它们涉及时间，特别是理想性的历史起源是否通过将它们与时间联系起来而损害了它们的全时间性。最终，我认为，理想的先验历史性尽管与有效性和可及性问题相关，但事实证明对其全时间性漠不关心。