We study, both theoretically and experimentally, a communication game with and without seller competition and embed it in a psychological-game framework where players experience costs for lying, misleading others, and being disappointed. We derive the equilibrium predictions of this model, compare them to the setting without psychological payoffs, and test these predictions in a laboratory experiment, in which we induce both material and psychological payoffs. We find that the setting in which players have both material and psychological payoffs features more trade, trades goods of marginally better quality, and does so without welfare losses to either side of the market relative to the setting with material payoffs only. However, the introduction of competition counteracts this improvement and lowers welfare for both sides of the market. This happens due to a surge in dishonesty by sellers in the competitive setting and the buyers’ inability to detect this deception.

中文翻译：

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相信我：心理游戏中的沟通与竞争

我们从理论上和实验上研究了有和没有卖家竞争的沟通游戏，并将其嵌入到心理游戏框架中，在该框架中，玩家体验说谎、误导他人和失望的成本。我们推导出该模型的均衡预测，将它们与没有心理回报的环境进行比较，并在实验室实验中测试这些预测，在实验中我们引入了物质和心理回报。我们发现，参与者同时获得物质和心理回报的环境具有更多的贸易特征，交易的商品质量稍好，并且相对于仅具有物质回报的环境，市场双方都没有福利损失。然而，竞争的引入抵消了这种改善并降低了市场双方的福利。发生这种情况的原因是，在竞争环境中，卖家的不诚实行为激增，而买家却无法发现这种欺骗行为。