ObjectiveWhen and why do U.S. leaders visit their allies or adversaries? Much of the literature on diplomatic visits treats each visit as an independent observation. In this article, we analyze high‐level diplomatic visits as compositional data based on the assumption that they are scarce political resources.MethodsWe conduct a compositional analysis of U.S. high‐level officials' diplomatic visits between 1950 and 2010.ResultsWe find that U.S. diplomatic visits to its allies are defense‐oriented, so leaders spend more time touring them during their security crises to signal reassurance. Additionally, we find that visits to adversaries are motivated by leaders' domestic political concerns, particularly their high public unpopularity. Visiting a hostile country is a challenging and salient foreign policy task, providing a high‐profile opportunity to improve their domestic image and standing. This effect is particularly significant in a divided government, where leaders turn to foreign policy to maximize domestic political impacts amid domestic gridlock.ConclusionThe findings suggest that U.S. leaders travel to allies and adversaries for distinct strategic purposes. Furthermore, our study suggests that future research on diplomatic visits should use a compositional variable approach to better model the dynamics and competitive nature of travel diplomacy.

中文翻译：

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前往盟友还是对手？美国外交访问的构成分析

目标美国领导人何时以及为何访问其盟友或对手？许多有关外交访问的文献都将每次访问视为一次独立的观察。在本文中，我们基于高层外交访问是稀缺政治资源的假设，将其作为构成数据进行分析。方法我们对1950年至2010年间美国高层外交访问进行了构成分析。结果我们发现，美国外交访问对盟友来说，这些都是以防御为导向的，因此领导人在安全危机期间花更多时间巡视他们，以发出保证的信号。此外，我们发现，领导人访问对手的动机是出于国内政治担忧，特别是他们在公众中的不受欢迎程度。访问敌对国家是一项具有挑战性和突出的外交政策任务，为改善其国内形象和地位提供了一个备受瞩目的机会。这种效应在分裂的政府中尤其显着，领导人在国内陷入僵局时转向外交政策，以最大限度地发挥国内政治影响。结论研究结果表明，美国领导人出于不同的战略目的而前往盟友和对手。此外，我们的研究表明，未来的外交访问研究应该使用组合变量方法来更好地模拟旅行外交的动态和竞争性质。