We present a logic of evidence that reduces agents’ epistemic idealisations by combining classical propositional logic with substructural modal logic for formulas in the scope of epistemic modalities. To this aim, we provide a neighborhood semantics of evidence, which provides a modal extension of Fine’s semantics for relevant propositional logic. Possible worlds semantics for classical propositional logic is then obtained by defining the set of possible worlds as a special subset of information states in Fine’s semantics. Finally, we prove that evidence is a hyperintensional and non-prime notion in our logic, and provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of our evidence logic.

我们提出了一种证据逻辑，通过将经典命题逻辑与认知模态范围内的公式的子结构模态逻辑相结合，减少主体的认知理想化。为此，我们提供了证据的邻域语义，它为相关命题逻辑提供了 Fine 语义的模态扩展。然后通过将可能世界集合定义为 Fine 语义中信息状态的特殊子集来获得经典命题逻辑的可能世界语义。最后，我们证明证据是我们逻辑中的超内涵和非素数概念，并为我们的证据逻辑提供了合理且完整的公理化。