I explore a previously neglected mechanism of mass mobilization in autocracies. Revolutionary leaders may deliberately provoke punishment from the incumbent regime to signal their political conviction and thus encourage citizens to identify with and support the revolutionary movement. I model the interplay of repression, criticism, and revolutionary actions as a dynamic game with incomplete information about the leader’s type. The role of the revolutionary leader is to enable people to identify with the movement by credibly embodying political change. From the incumbent’s perspective, repression turns out to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a severe punishment of critics increases citizens’ cost of participating in revolutionary actions. On the other hand, harsh repressions may simultaneously establish a trustworthy leader whom people want to follow in order to replace the current political regime. My results thus help explain a stylized fact, namely that revolutionary leaders sometimes need to fail before they can succeed.

我探索了一种以前被忽视的独裁国家的群众动员机制。革命领导人可能会故意激起现任政权的惩罚，以表明他们的政治信念，从而鼓励公民认同和支持革命运动。我将镇压、批评和革命行动的相互作用建模为一个动态博弈，其中关于领导人类型的信息不完整。革命领袖的作用是通过可信地体现政治变革，使人们认同这场运动。从现任者的角度来看，镇压是一把双刃剑。一方面，对批评者的严厉惩罚增加了公民参与革命行动的成本。另一方面，严厉的镇压可能会同时建立一个值得信赖的领导人，人们愿意追随他以取代当前的政权。因此，我的结果有助于解释一个典型的事实，即革命领导人有时需要失败才能成功。