The European Union (EU) has taken a geoeconomic turn since 2017 by creating a series of new unilateral instruments designed to preserve European autonomy and adjust to the progressive unravelling of the liberal international economic order. The most controversial of these instruments is the 2023 Anti‐Coercion Instrument (ACI), designed to deter third countries from targeting the EU and its member states with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. This article analyses why this new policy instrument was created, traces its institutional genesis and explores its implications by asking whether the ACI represents an intentional attempt to transform the foreign policy issue of coercion into a commercial one. Using process tracing based on interviews and primary and secondary materials, we argue that ‘foreign policy becoming trade policy’ through the ACI was an unintended consequence both of external pressures to institutionalise the trade–security nexus and of the EU's uneven internal competence base.

中文翻译：

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当外交政策成为贸易政策：欧盟的反胁迫工具

自 2017 年以来，欧盟 (EU) 采取了地缘经济转向，制定了一系列新的单边工具，旨在维护欧洲自主权并适应自由国际经济秩序的逐步瓦解。这些文书中最具争议的是2023年反胁迫文书（ACI），旨在阻止第三国通过影响贸易或投资的措施对欧盟及其成员国进行经济胁迫。本文分析了为什么要创建这一新的政策工具，追溯其制度起源，并通过询问 ACI 是否代表着将强制外交政策问题转变为商业问题的有意尝试来探讨其影响。利用基于访谈和主要和次要材料的过程追踪，我们认为，通过 ACI 实现的“外交政策成为贸易政策”是贸易安全关系制度化的外部压力和欧盟内部能力基础不平衡的意外结果。