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Storable votes with a “pay as you win” mechanism
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination ( IF 1.237 ) Pub Date : 2024-02-28 , DOI: 10.1007/s11403-024-00407-1
Arturo Macías

This paper introduces a new storable vote mechanism (Storable Votes-Pay as you win, SV-PAYW) where a fixed number of votes is cast among different alternatives, and the votes spent (and redistributed) on each election depend only on the number cast for the winning alternative. The mechanism is expected to deliver more enfranchisement, efficiency and a reduction of uncertainty and strategic behavior with respect to previously known voting systems. To compare the pure storable votes with the SV-PAYW implementations, two key characteristics are monitored: the “enfranchisement gap”, which measures the proportionality between political influence and electoral victories, and the “efficiency ratio”, which assesses the utility derived from the allocation of electoral victories on a scale from random allocation (zero) to the social optimum (one). SV-PAYW consistently outperforms pure storable votes in terms of enfranchisement in all cases. Additionally, as a general rule (there are some exceptions), the “efficiency ratio” tends to be higher for SV-PAYW, hovering around 0.7.



中文翻译:

可存储的选票,具有“赢了就付费”的机制

本文介绍了一种新的可存储投票机制(Storable Votes-Pay as you win,SV-PAYW),其中在不同的备选方案之间投出固定数量的选票,并且每次选举花费(和重新分配)的选票仅取决于投票的数量为获胜的选择。与先前已知的投票系统相比,该机制预计将提供更多的选举权、效率并减少不确定性和战略行为。为了将纯可存储选票与 SV-PAYW 实施进行比较,需要监控两个关键特征:“选举权差距”,衡量政治影响力与选举胜利之间的比例;以及“效率比”,评估从选举权中获得的效用。选举胜利的分配范围从随机分配(零)到社会最优分配(一)。在所有情况下,SV-PAYW 在选举权方面始终优于纯可存储选票。此外,作为一般规则(也有一些例外),SV-PAYW 的“效率比”往往较高,徘徊在 0.7 左右。

更新日期:2024-02-29
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