Abstract

Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.

中文翻译：

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社会颠覆性技术和认知不公正

摘要

最近关于技术引发的“概念颠覆”的学术研究强调了概念差距的概念。关于认知不公正的学术界也讨论了概念差距，但到目前为止，这些工作仍然相互脱节。本文表明，两个文献的兴趣“差距”密切相关，并认为对概念破坏和认知不公正的联合审查对于这两个领域都是富有成效的。我认为，解释学边缘化——解释学资源的倾斜划分，其作用是减少边缘化人群的经历——不仅是因为概念差距而发生，而且还因为另外两种概念破坏：概念重叠和概念错位。因此，可以通过认知不公正的规范视角来有效研究多种概念破坏。技术可以在认知不公正方面发挥不同的作用，既可以作为概念破坏的因果触发因素，也可以作为解释学资源的调解者。它的作用在规范上具有重要意义，特别是因为具有社会颠覆性的技术可能对不同群体产生不同的认知影响：它们可能会放大某些群体的认知资源，同时减少其他群体的认知资源。