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Strategic analysis of green technology unilateral licensing under carbon cap‐and‐trade policy
Managerial and Decision Economics ( IF 1.379 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-01 , DOI: 10.1002/mde.4148
Gui‐Hua Lin 1 , Yang‐Ping Liu 1 , Qi Zhang 1
Affiliation  

We investigate green technology unilateral licensing strategies between two competing manufacturers under carbon cap‐and‐trade policy. We construct Nash game models and compare the optimal strategies in the unilateral licensing situation with the no‐licensing situation. Comprehensive numerical experiments are taken to investigate the influence of some key parameters on optimal decisions. Our findings show that the green technology unilateral licensing strategy may benefit consumers; when green technology improvement is high, manufacturers tend to take the unilateral licensing strategy to obtain more profits; when initial unit carbon emission difference is moderate or large, the optimal strategy is that the manufacturer with lower level of green technology acts as the licensor; green technology unilateral licensing strategy may not necessarily reduce all manufacturers' total carbon emissions; only when green technology improvement is high, the unilateral licensing strategy is beneficial to environmental protection.

中文翻译:

碳限额与交易政策下绿色技术单边许可的策略分析

我们研究了碳限额与交易政策下两家竞争制造商之间的绿色技术单边许可策略。我们构建了纳什博弈模型,并比较了单方许可情况和无许可情况下的最优策略。通过综合数值实验来研究一些关键参数对最优决策的影响。我们的研究结果表明,绿色技术单边许可策略可能使消费者受益;当绿色技术进步较高时,制造商倾向于采取单边许可策略来获取更多利润;当初始单位碳排放差异中等或较大时,最优策略是绿色技术水平较低的制造商作为许可方;绿色技术单边许可策略不一定能减少所有制造商的总碳排放量;只有当绿色技术进步较高时,单边许可策略才有利于环境保护。
更新日期:2024-03-01
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