This study examines the association between dispersion in pay‐performance sensitivities (PPS) among top management team (TMT) members and managerial efficiency. While prior research has focused on managerial efficiency as an innate characteristic of managers, this study explores how managerial incentive dispersion shapes managerial efficiency. Using a sample of US firms from 1993 to 2019, we find a negative relationship between TMT incentive dispersion and managerial efficiency, suggesting that higher levels of incentive dispersion can potentially affect managerial efficiency by reducing coordination and cooperation among TMT members. We employ a range of robustness tests and find consistent and robust results. Overall, this study contributes to the literature on executive compensation by providing novel insights into the implications of incentive dispersion among executives for managerial efficiency.

中文翻译：

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高层管理团队激励分散与管理效率

本研究探讨了高层管理团队 (TMT) 成员的薪酬绩效敏感度 (PPS) 离散度与管理效率之间的关联。虽然先前的研究重点关注管理效率作为管理者的固有特征，但本研究探讨了管理激励分散如何塑造管理效率。通过使用 1993 年至 2019 年的美国企业样本，我们发现 TMT 激励分散与管理效率之间存在负相关关系，这表明较高水平的激励分散可能会通过减少 TMT 成员之间的协调与合作来影响管理效率。我们采用了一系列稳健性测试并找到了一致且稳健的结果。总体而言，本研究对高管激励分散对管理效率的影响提供了新颖的见解，为高管薪酬的文献做出了贡献。