The present paper argues that, despite appearance to the contrary, Kierkegaard’s writings offer promising argumentational resources for addressing the problem of evil. According to Kierkegaard, however, in order to make use of these resources at all, one must necessarily be willing to shift the battleground, so to speak: from a third- to a genuine first-person perspective, namely the perspective of what Climacus dubs Religiousness A. All (yet also only) those who seek deliberate self-annihilation before God—a God in relation to whom they perceive themselves always in the wrong—shall discover the ideal that an unwavering and in fact unconditional thankfulness (namely, for being forgiven) is to be considered the only appropriate attitude towards God and as such both necessary and sufficient for coming to terms with evil and suffering, at least in the life of someone making that discovery. I will argue that Kierkegaard’s (non-)pseudonymous writings provide reasons, at times unwittingly, for adopting the perspective of Religiousness A; however, I will also and ultimately argue that the principle of infinite thankfulness as a corollary of that perspective flounders when it comes to making sense of (the eschatological implications of) the suffering of others.

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感恩：克尔凯郭尔对邪恶问题的第一人称视角

本文认为，尽管表面上相反，克尔凯郭尔的著作为解决邪恶问题提供了有希望的论证资源。然而，根据克尔凯郭尔的观点，为了充分利用这些资源，人们必须愿意转移战场，可以这么说：从第三人称视角到真正的第一人称视角，即克利马库斯所说的视角宗教性 A. 所有（但也只是）那些在上帝面前寻求故意自我毁灭的人——他们认为自己在上帝面前总是错的——将发现一种坚定不移的、事实上无条件的感激之情（即，对上帝的感激之情）。被宽恕）被认为是对上帝唯一适当的态度，因此对于接受邪恶和痛苦来说是必要和充分的，至少在做出这一发现的人的生活中是这样。我认为，克尔凯郭尔（非）笔名的著作有时无意地为采用宗教性 A 的观点提供了理由；然而，我最终也会指出，当涉及到理解他人的苦难（其末世论含义）时，作为该观点推论的无限感恩的原则就会陷入困境。