Problem definition: The rapid expansion of distributed energy resources (DERs) is one of the most significant changes to electricity systems around the world. Examples of DERs include solar panels, electric storage, thermal storage, and combined heat and power plants. Because of the small supply capacities of these DERs, it is impractical for them to participate directly in the wholesale electricity market. We study in this paper the question of how to integrate these DER supplies into the electricity market, with the objective of achieving full market efficiency. Methodology/results: We study four aggregation models, where there is an aggregator who, with the knowledge of DERs’ utility functions and generations, procures electricity from DERs, and sells them in the wholesale market. In the first aggregation model, a profit-maximizing aggregator announces a differential two-part pricing policy to the DER owners. We show that this model preserves full market efficiency, that is, the social welfare achieved by this model is the same as that when DERs participate directly in the wholesale market. In the second aggregation model, the profit-seeking aggregator is forced to impose a uniform two-part pricing policy to prosumers from the same location, and we numerically show that there can be large efficiency loss. In the third (fourth) aggregation model, a uniform (semiuniform) two-part pricing policy is applied to DER owners, whereas the aggregator becomes fully regulated but is guaranteed nonnegative (positive) profit. It is shown that these models again achieve full market efficiency. Furthermore, we show that DER aggregation also leads to a reduction in the market power of conventional generators. Managerial implications: DER aggregation via profit-seeking and/or regulated aggregators has been investigated by California Independent System Operator and New York Independent System Operator, among others, and the recent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No. 2222 paved the way for aggregators to bid in the wholesale market. Our four aggregation models may shed light on how DERs should be included in the wholesale electricity market.Funding: This work was supported by the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals [Grant INML2106] and the National Science Foundation [Grant 1832230].Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0539 .

中文翻译：

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聚合分布式能源：效率和市场力量

问题定义：分布式能源（DER）的快速扩张是全球电力系统最重大的变化之一。分布式能源的例子包括太阳能电池板、蓄电装置、蓄热装置以及热电联产装置。由于这些分布式能源的供电能力较小，直接参与电力批发市场是不切实际的。我们在本文中研究了如何将这些分布式能源供应纳入电力市场的问题，以实现充分的市场效率。方法/结果：我们研究了四种聚合模型，其中有一个聚合者，了解分布式能源的效用函数和发电量，从分布式能源采购电力，并在批发市场上出售。在第一个聚合模型中，利润最大化聚合者向 DER 所有者宣布差别的两部分定价政策。我们证明该模型保留了充分的市场效率，即该模型实现的社会福利与 DER 直接参与批发市场时获得的社会福利相同。在第二种聚合模型中，寻求利润的聚合者被迫对同一地点的产消者实施统一的两部分定价政策，我们从数字上表明，这可能会造成巨大的效率损失。在第三（第四）聚合模型中，统一（半统一）两部分定价政策应用于 DER 所有者，而聚合器受到全面监管，但保证非负（正）利润。结果表明，这些模型再次实现了充分的市场效率。此外，我们还表明，分布式能源聚合还会导致传统发电机的市场力量下降。管理影响：加州独立系统运营商和纽约独立系统运营商等已经对通过营利和/或受监管聚合商进行的 DER 聚合进行了调查，最近的联邦能源管理委员会第 2222 号命令为聚合商竞标铺平了道路在批发市场。我们的四个聚合模型可能有助于阐明分布式能源应如何纳入批发电力市场。 资金：这项工作得到了法赫德国王石油和矿产大学 [Grant INML2106] 和国家科学基金会 [Grant 1832230] 的支持。补充材料：在线附录可在 https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0539 获取。