This paper develops the idea that valid arguments are equivalent to true conditionals by combining Kripke’s theory of truth with the evidential account of conditionals offered by Crupi and Iacona. As will be shown, in a first-order language that contains a naïve truth predicate and a suitable conditional, one can define a validity predicate in accordance with the thesis that the inference from a conjunction of premises to a conclusion is valid when the corresponding conditional is true. The validity predicate so defined significantly increases our expressive resources and provides a coherent formal treatment of paradoxical arguments.

中文翻译：

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朴素真理和证据条件

本文通过将克里普克的真理论与克鲁皮和艾科纳提供的条件句的证据说明相结合，提出了有效论证等同于真条件句的观点。正如将要显示的，在包含朴素真值谓词和适当条件的一阶语言中，我们可以根据这样的论点来定义有效性谓词：当相应的条件时，从前提到结论的合取的推论是有效的。是真的。如此定义的有效性谓词显着增加了我们的表达资源，并为矛盾的论证提供了连贯的形式处理。