Conceptual engineers are always on the lookout for concepts that can be improved upon or replaced. Kevin Scharp has argued that the concept truth is inconsistent, and that this inconsistency thwarts its ability to serve in philosophical and scientific explanatory projects, such as developing linguistic theories of meaning. In this paper I present Scharp’s view about what makes a concept inconsistent, and why he believes that truth in particular is inconsistent. Then I examine the concepts that he suggests should replace truth for various explanatory and expressive duties. I argue that those concepts are not up to the tasks for which they are posited, and so Scharp’s replacement methodology itself needs to be reengineered.

概念工程师总是在寻找可以改进或替换的概念。凯文·沙普认为，真理这一概念是不一致的，这种不一致阻碍了它在哲学和科学解释项目中的服务能力，例如发展意义的语言理论。在本文中，我介绍了沙普关于概念不一致的原因以及他为什么相信真理尤其不一致的观点。然后我研究了他建议的应该取代真理来履行各种解释和表达职责的概念。我认为这些概念不能胜任它们所承担的任务，因此沙普的替代方法本身需要重新设计。