The relation between wage growth and the reconstruction of the labor movement in Spain, during the developmentalist Francoist regime (1957-1975), has been controversial. Applying the power resources theory in order to explain wage growth, this paper argues that the rise of the labor share was the result of the increased bargaining power of workers in spite of repressive policies of the Francoist government. The action of new trade unionism mobilized the following power resources. First, the structural power increased as a consequence of techno-economics transformations of Fordism and a generational change of the labor force. Second, the associational power increased due to new organizational forms, with more democratic modes of collective action and combining clandestine and legal actions, and the reappearance of collective bargaining with the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements of 1958. These political opportunities opened up the possibility to the new trade unionist of developing the strategy of entryism that served as the driving force for worker mobilization.

Consequently, the new trade unionists could mobilize their power resources in the three spheres, exchange, production, and politics, as a strategy by accelerating collaborative action, establishing a discursive and cultural framework, and allowing the articulation of the different trade union actions. In this way, internal solidarity was favored when a collective agreement was negotiated at the company or sector level (and not an individual contract, as it has been to date), due to the links with the social activities characteristic of the paternalistic management of labor relations and the presence of anti-Francoist organizations, the “network embeddedness” was strengthened. In turn, the successes in the consequence of wage increases and solidarity with other workers who were suffering repression increased the narrative resources that frame union actions. All this made it possible to counterbalance in part for the restrictions imposed by the dictatorship, which weakened the structural power of workers in the political sphere.

The main contribution to the existing knowledge on the issue consists in explaining the apparent paradox between the wage policy of the Francoist government (oriented towards wage restriction) and the increase in labor share. This also serves to understand how labor markets and the wage-setting mechanism worked from a historical point of view. As a corollary, the previous analysis implies that the most important factor was the ability to mobilize workers successfully. The union strategy that combined democratic instruments of representation (assemblies) with clandestine and legal actions served as a catalyst for other productive and social changes. This reflects the primacy of the action of social actors for the worker mobilization theory.

在发展主义的佛朗哥政权（1957-1975）期间，西班牙工资增长与劳工运动重建之间的关系一直存在争议。本文应用权力资源理论来解释工资增长，认为劳动份额的上升是尽管佛朗哥政府实行压制性政策，但工人议价能力增强的结果。新工会主义的行动动员了以下权力资源。首先，由于福特主义的技术经济转型和劳动力的代际变化，结构性力量有所增强。其次，由于新的组织形式、更民主的集体行动模式以及将秘密行动与合法行动相结合，以及1958年《集体谈判协议法》中集体谈判的重新出现，结社权力得到了增强。这些政治机会为工会的发展提供了可能性。新工会成员制定了进入主义战略，作为工人动员的驱动力。

因此，新的工会成员可以通过加速协作行动、建立话语和文化框架以及允许阐明不同的工会行动来调动其在交换、生产和政治三个领域的权力资源作为战略。这样，当在公司或部门层面谈判集体协议（而不是迄今为止的个人合同）时，由于与家长式劳动管理的社会活动特征的联系，内部团结受到青睐关系和反佛朗哥组织的存在，“网络嵌入”得到加强。反过来，工资上涨以及与其他遭受镇压的工人的团结所带来的成功增加了构成工会行动的叙事资源。所有这些都可以在一定程度上抵消独裁政权施加的限制，削弱工人在政治领域的结构性权力。

对这个问题现有知识的主要贡献在于解释了佛朗哥政府的工资政策（以工资限制为导向）与劳动份额增加之间明显的矛盾。这也有助于从历史角度理解劳动力市场和工资设定机制是如何运作的。作为推论，之前的分析表明最重要的因素是成功动员工人的能力。将民主代表手段（议会）与秘密和法律行动相结合的工会战略成为其他生产和社会变革的催化剂。这反映了社会行动者的行动对于工人动员理论的首要地位。