The probability that an event will avalanche into an impairment of essential services constitutes a “systemic risk.” Owing to the inherent complexities of modern societies, the outbreak of a novel disease or the failure of a financial institution can rapidly escalate into an impact significantly larger than the initial event. Through the lens of complex system theory, this article draws a parallel between financial crises and disasters to contend that the regulatory framework for financial systemic risk is unequipped to address its fundamental dynamics. Epitomized by the market failure rationale, financial regulation is premised on a reductionist view that purports both systemic risk and law as external to the actions of market participants. Conversely, this article advances a twofold conceptual framework. First, it shows that systemic risk emerges from the same complex dynamics that generate the financial system. Second, it understands law as an agent of complexity, thus contributing to the emergence of finance and its inherent instability. Normatively, this conceptual framework reveals the limits of current regulatory approaches and constructs a holistic risk governance framework that is akin to the one adopted to govern disaster risks.

中文翻译：

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不要称之为失败：复杂金融系统的系统性风险治理

事件导致基本服务受损的可能性构成“系统性风险”。由于现代社会固有的复杂性，一种新疾病的爆发或金融机构的倒闭可能会迅速升级为比最初事件大得多的影响。本文通过复杂系统理论的视角，将金融危机与灾难进行类比，认为金融系统性风险的监管框架不足以解决其基本动态。以市场失灵为代表的金融监管以还原论观点为前提，该观点认为系统性风险和法律是市场参与者行为的外部因素。相反，本文提出了一个双重概念框架。首先，它表明系统性风险是由金融体系的复杂动态产生的。其次，它将法律理解为复杂性的推动者，从而促进了金融的出现及其固有的不稳定性。从规范上讲，这一概念框架揭示了当前监管方法的局限性，并构建了一个类似于治理灾害风险的整体风险治理框架。