This study delves into the impact of cross-platform externality on the pricing strategies of platforms, employing a two-stage discriminatory pricing model. The research reveals several significant findings. Initially, cross-platform externality exacerbates the “killing the loyal customers” strategy on the access platform, prompting consumers to favor a “one-time” consumption approach to avoid potential intensification of this strategy. Furthermore, cross-platform externality serves as a critical trigger for independent competitive platforms; surpassing a critical consumer threshold leads to a shift from the former “killing the loyal customers” strategy to offering more favorable prices for existing customers. Finally, cross-platform externality leads to reduced prices for consumers on both platforms in both stages, assuming the drainage effect of the open platform is substantially weaker than its enhancement effect on the cross-network externality of the access platform. During such instances, the cross-platform externality proves advantageous to consumers. However, with a strengthening drainage effect and increased merchant attraction by the access platform, both platforms may face potential price increases. Notably, cross-platform externalities provide access platforms with substantial advantages over independent competitors in terms of user scale and profit levels. This advantage progressively grows as cross-platform externalities increase. However, for the access platform itself, the influx of consumers from the open platform must surpass a minimal threshold before cross-platform externalities contribute to an increase in the access platform's profit levels. Consequently, if the objective of engaging in platform discriminatory pricing competition is to overcome competitors, integrating with an open platform proves to be an effective approach. However, if the goal is solely to boost one's own profits, embracing an open platform entails certain risks, necessitating the selection of a platform capable of delivering sufficient traffic.

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跨平台外部性如何影响定价策略？两阶段歧视性定价模型分析

本研究采用两阶段歧视定价模型，深入探讨跨平台外部性对平台定价策略的影响。该研究揭示了几个重要的发现。最初，跨平台外部性加剧了接入平台上的“杀死忠实客户”策略，促使消费者倾向于“一次性”消费方式，以避免这种策略的潜在加剧。此外，跨平台外部性是独立竞争平台的关键触发因素；超过关键的消费者门槛导致从以前的“杀死忠实客户”策略转向为现有客户提供更优惠的价格。最后，假设开放平台的引流效应远弱于其对接入平台跨网络外部性的增强效应，那么跨平台外部性会导致两个阶段的消费者价格下降。在这种情况下，跨平台的外部性对消费者来说是有利的。但随着接入平台引流效应的加强和商家吸引力的增加，两个平台都可能面临潜在的价格上涨。值得注意的是，跨平台的外部性使接入平台在用户规模和利润水平方面比独立竞争对手具有显着优势。随着跨平台外部性的增加，这种优势逐渐增强。然而，对于接入平台本身而言，开放平台的消费者涌入必须超过一个最低门槛，跨平台外部性才会有助于接入平台利润水平的提高。因此，如果参与平台歧视性定价竞争的目的是战胜竞争对手，那么与开放平台的整合被证明是一个有效的途径。但如果单纯以自身盈利为目的，采用开放平台是有一定风险的，需要选择能够提供足够流量的平台。