We study two‐player R&D contest design using both an information disclosure policy and a quality standard as instruments. The ability of an innovator is known only to himself. The organizer commits ex‐ante to a minimum quality standard and whether to have innovators' abilities publicly revealed before they conduct R&D activities. We find that without quality standards, fully concealing innovators' abilities elicits both higher expected aggregate quality and expected highest quality. With optimally set quality standards, although fully concealing ability information still elicits higher expected aggregate quality, fully disclosing this information leads to a higher level of expected highest quality. Moreover, the optimal quality standards are compared across different objectives and disclosure policies.

中文翻译：

---

研发竞赛中信息披露与质量标准的结合*

我们使用信息披露政策和质量标准作为工具来研究双人研发竞赛设计。创新者的能力只有他自己知道。组织者事前承诺最低质量标准，以及是否在创新者进行研发活动之前公开展示他们的能力。我们发现，如果没有质量标准，完全隐藏创新者的能力会导致更高的预期总体质量和预期最高质量。通过最佳设置的质量标准，尽管完全隐藏能力信息仍然会带来更高的预期总体质量，但完全公开此信息会导致更高水平的预期最高质量。此外，还对不同目标和披露政策的最佳质量标准进行了比较。