We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle‐blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle‐blower. We develop a three‐stage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistle‐blower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistle‐blowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivity‐based rewards are superior to benefit‐based rewards.

中文翻译：

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举报和雇用激励

我们考虑了以前被忽视的举报人奖励成本：雇主可能会根据边际而不是员工的生产力，而是根据员工成为举报人的可能性来做出雇用决定。我们开发了一个三阶段模型来研究由于招聘阶段的扭曲而导致的生产力损失如何影响最佳举报人奖励。我们描述了举报的最佳奖励，并表明，当可以根据雇主因犯罪而获得的利益或受雇工人的生产力来选择奖励时，基于生产力的奖励优于基于利益的奖励。