In this article we study whether an elected leader has incentives to withdraw from an ongoing military conflict before elections take place. Remaining active in the conflict increases the chances of a victory, which would boost the political incumbent’s reelection probability. On the other hand, if the rival does not surrender, then the incumbent politician’s reelection probability decreases because of the costly conflict citizens have to endure. We show that when the crisis is costly to voters, the more distant the elections are, the more likely the ruling government withdraws from an ongoing war early. For low-cost conflicts, politicians never give up the fighting. We also show that confrontations in the shadow of elections are socially inefficient (too long or too short) because of the inherent misalignment of preferences between citizens and politicians.

在本文中，我们研究当选领导人是否有动机在选举前退出正在进行的军事冲突。在冲突中保持活跃会增加获胜的机会，从而提高政治人物连任的可能性。另一方面，如果对手不投降，那么现任政治家的连任概率就会降低，因为公民必须忍受代价高昂的冲突。我们表明，当危机让选民付出高昂代价时，选举距离越远，执政政府就越有可能提前退出正在进行的战争。对于低成本冲突，政客们永远不会放弃战斗。我们还表明，由于公民和政治家之间固有的偏好不一致，选举阴影下的对抗在社会上效率低下（太长或太短）。