Abstract

Using newly collected data on ties between local politicians in Italy from 1985 onwards, this paper studies the relation between cross-party connections and future career prospects. Exploiting a difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that ruling coalition members connected with the leader of the opposition in local councils are twice as likely to be promoted to the local government. The results are confirmed with a number of placebo exercises. Interestingly, the effect of connections with the leader of the rivals disappears when I consider appointments to boards of state-owned enterprises or to other councils in which the party faces different politicians as opponents. A possible mechanism that may account for these results is that connected politicians act as political brokers and smooth the relationship between government and opposition. Finally, connected politicians are less educated than the average appointed official, indicating that political selection is negatively affected (Besley et al. in Econ J 121(554):F205–F227, 2011).

中文翻译：

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“让朋友更亲近，让敌人更亲近”：人际关系和政治生涯

摘要

本文利用新收集的 1985 年以来意大利地方政治家之间关系的数据，研究跨党派关系与未来职业前景之间的关系。利用间断差异设计，我发现与地方议会中反对派领导人有联系的执政联盟成员晋升到地方政府的可能性是其两倍。结果通过大量安慰剂练习得到证实。有趣的是，当我考虑任命国有企业董事会或其他委员会的成员时，与竞争对手领导人的联系的影响就消失了，而在这些委员会中，党面临着不同的政客作为对手。造成这些结果的一个可能机制是，有联系的政客充当政治掮客，缓和政府与反对派之间的关系。最后，有联系的政客受教育程度低于一般任命官员，这表明政治选择受到负面影响（Besley 等人，in Econ J 121(554):F205–F227, 2011）。