As an effective external governance factor, the effectiveness of analysts' governance and tracking options has been one of the most important topics of research. In recent years, there has been an influx of capital from real companies into finance, real estate and other industries related to the virtual economy, which has a significant impact on the financial position of companies and can also affect analysts' tracking choices. This paper takes A‐share listed companies from 2010 to 2021 as the research object and finds that as the financialisation of enterprises deepens, the number of analysts' tracking decreases; however, with the increase of market attention, the negative impact of the financialisation of enterprises on analysts' tracking will be weakened. Further research shows that, first, financial risk plays a mediating role between corporate financialisation and analyst tracking, in that corporate financialisation increases financial risk, which in turn leads to a decrease in the number of analyst tracking; second, as institutional investors have a greater influence on analysts, the impact of corporate financialisation on analyst tracking is weakened as the shareholding of institutional investors increases; finally, that holding two different types of financial assets, short‐term and long‐term, also has different consequences. The findings of this paper examine the impact of corporate financialisation from the analyst's perspective, confirming the identification and selection capabilities that analysts have.

中文翻译：

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企业金融化、市场关注和分析师追踪

作为有效的外部治理因素，分析师治理和跟踪选项的有效性一直是最重要的研究课题之一。近年来，资金从实体企业大量涌入金融、房地产等与虚拟经济相关的行业，这对企业的财务状况产生重大影响，也会影响分析师的跟踪选择。本文以2010年至2021年A股上市公司为研究对象，发现随着企业金融化程度的加深，分析师跟踪数量减少；但随着市场关注度的提高，企业金融化对分析师追踪的负面影响将会减弱。进一步研究表明，首先，财务风险在企业金融化与分析师追踪之间起到中介作用，企业金融化增加了财务风险，进而导致分析师追踪数量的减少；其次，由于机构投资者对分析师的影响力较大，企业金融化对分析师跟踪的影响随着机构投资者持股的增加而减弱；最后，持有短期和长期两种不同类型的金融资产也会产生不同的后果。本文的研究结果从分析师的角度审视了企业金融化的影响，证实了分析师所具有的识别和选择能力。