Why are impartial institutions such as formalized property rights so important for the emergence of impersonal trade? Previous literature has stressed the role of such institutions in providing third-party enforcement to shield strangers from locals’ opportunism. We document the existence of a second mechanism based on the role of formalized property rights in inducing respect for the property of strangers, regardless of enforcement. Ten years after the randomized introduction of formal property rights across rural Benin, we conducted a taking-dictator-game experiment in which participants could appropriate the endowment of an anonymous stranger from a different village. Even if enforcement institutions are absent and peer effects are silenced by design, participants from villages where the reform was implemented took significantly less than those in control villages. We further give consideration to several possible transmission channels and discuss their plausibility (JEL: D02, D91, K11, K42).

中文翻译：

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陌生人的财产

为什么诸如正式产权之类的公正制度对于非个人贸易的出现如此重要？先前的文献强调了此类机构在提供第三方执法以保护陌生人免受当地人机会主义侵害方面的作用。我们记录了第二种机制的存在，该机制基于正式产权在诱导尊重陌生人财产方面的作用，无论执行情况如何。在贝宁农村地区随机引入正式产权十年后，我们进行了一项独裁者博弈实验，参与者可以侵占来自不同村庄的匿名陌生人的捐赠。即使执行机构不存在并且故意压制同侪效应，实施改革的村庄的参与者所获得的收入也明显低于对照村庄的参与者。我们进一步考虑了几种可能的传输通道并讨论了它们的合理性（JEL：D02、D91、K11、K42）。