Disagreement abounds on what exactly constitutes an ‘abuse’ within article 102 TFEU, EU competition law’s prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position. This situation is highly undesirable, given the important role this prohibition is expected to play in alleviating concerns about substantial market power and its use in important sectors, typified by actions against ‘Big Tech’. This article responds to this problem by analysing and synthesising the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its evolution to establish the constituent elements of an exclusionary ‘abuse’. The article corrects crucial legal misconceptions, including the putative dichotomy between violations ‘by object’ and ‘by effect’; the assumed disparate legal tests for pricing and non-pricing conduct; and the lost distinction between the ‘as efficient competitor test’ and the ‘as efficient competitor standard’. This critical inquiry allows one to draw concrete predictions on the future development of this challenging, yet vital, area of law.

中文翻译：

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对欧盟竞争法中“滥用”的批判性调查

对于《欧盟竞争法》第 102 条（欧盟竞争法禁止滥用支配地位）中“滥用”的具体构成，存在很多分歧。鉴于这一禁令预计将在缓解人们对巨大市场力量及其在重要行业（以针对“大型科技”的行动为代表）中的使用的担忧方面发挥重要作用，这种情况是非常不可取的。本文通过分析和综合欧盟法院的判例及其演变来回答这个问题，以确定排他性“滥用”的构成要素。该文章纠正了重要的法律误解，包括“按对象”和“按效果”侵权之间假定的二分法；假设的定价和非定价行为的不同法律测试；以及“高效竞争对手测试”和“高效竞争对手标准”之间的区别。这一批判性的探究使人们能够对这一具有挑战性但又至关重要的法律领域的未来发展做出具体的预测。