In this paper, we investigate the effect of analyst distance on the assignment of credit ratings and show that issuers with analysts located in more distant offices obtain more conservative ratings than issuers with analysts located closer. Our results are robust to an analyst home bias and suggest that more distant analysts are subject to an informational disadvantage when conducting their rating analysis. Given an asymmetric reputational cost function that penalizes an overestimation of credit quality more heavily than an underestimation, assigning more conservative ratings is a rational response to the higher levels of information uncertainty that a greater distance can entail.

中文翻译：

---

分析师距离和信用评级一致性

在本文中，我们研究了分析师距离对信用评级分配的影响，结果表明，分析师位置较远的发行人比分析师位置较近的发行人获得更保守的评级。我们的结果对于分析师本地偏见来说是稳健的，并表明更远的分析师在进行评级分析时会受到信息劣势的影响。鉴于不对称的声誉成本函数对高估信用质量的惩罚比低估信用质量的惩罚更大，因此给予更保守的评级是对更大距离可能带来的更高水平的信息不确定性的理性反应。