This article proposes a dynamic model to examine the structure of “simple” relational contracts, obeying realistic properties that can be easily understood and audited by both parties. In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter cheating limits the number of relationships a buyer can sustain. Trade is thus restricted to durable relationships, a form of social capital. Nevertheless, exogenous stochastic shocks sometimes prevent suppliers from fulfilling their promises and relationships are constantly dissolving and later renewed. Moreover, the coming of a crisis, where stochastic shocks are more probable, can lead to the quick rupture of some relationships as there is less expected future business to incentivize all suppliers. New relationships can later be formed, but this takes time due to search frictions. This suggests new connections between the theory of relational contracting and the macroeconomic analysis of recessions.

中文翻译：

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简单的关系契约和社会资本的动态

本文提出了一个动态模型来检查“简单”关系合约的结构，遵循双方都可以轻松理解和审计的现实属性。在这种关系中，需要为每个供应商提供足够大的未来业务份额以阻止作弊，这限制了买方可以维持的关系数量。因此，贸易仅限于持久的关系，这是社会资本的一种形式。然而，外生的随机冲击有时会阻止供应商履行其承诺，并且关系会不断瓦解，然后又重新恢复。此外，当危机来临时，随机冲击的可能性更大，可能会导致一些关系的迅速破裂，因为未来业务无法激励所有供应商。稍后可以建立新的关系，但由于搜索摩擦，这需要时间。这表明关系契约理论与衰退的宏观经济分析之间存在新的联系。