In this paper, we show that the public provision of information on Australian schools’ average national test score outcomes via the website, launched in 2010, resulted in poorly performing schools testing fewer students in subsequent years. This increased non-participation in testing was driven primarily by formal parental withdrawal, and poorly performing students were much more likely to be withdrawn from testing. This phenomenon is consistent with schools attempting to ‘game’ the system to improve published test scores. We also provide weaker evidence that withdrawal responded more strongly to initial poor performance in independent private schools than in government schools.

中文翻译：

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学校问责制改革的意外后果：公立学校与私立学校

在本文中，我们表明，通过 2010 年推出的网站公开提供有关澳大利亚学校平均全国考试成绩的信息，导致表现不佳的学校在随后的几年中测试的学生数量减少。不参加测试的增加主要是由于家长正式退出而导致的，表​​现不佳的学生更有可能退出测试。这种现象与学校试图通过“游戏”系统来提高公布的考试成绩是一致的。我们还提供了较弱的证据表明，与公立学校相比，独立私立学校对最初表现不佳的退学反应更为强烈。