This article critically examines reasons for the persistent use of states of emergency (SOEs) as a tool of crime control in Jamaica and risks associated with normalising these measures in small, low-capacity, competitive democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We attend to the question of permanent SOEs as an issue of law and certain policing methods becoming normalised. This differs from scholars who think about the use of permanent SOEs as suspension of law or executive rule and make a clear distinction between law and violence and normalcy and emergency. Our findings show that persistent usage of SOEs in Jamaica reflects the incapacity of the state to control violent crime as well as its effort to strengthen its coercive capabilities and compensate for the ineffectiveness of the police. It is also a response to public demand for SOE policing. State strengthening is a necessary condition for a more peaceful and law-abiding society but is also a carrier of risks of democratic degeneration via rights-disregarding policing. Nonetheless, we have seen authoritarian management of crime without descent into authoritarianism, in general, and strong boundary-marking and patrolling by some state-oversight institutions that enjoy the support of civil society.

本文批判性地探讨了牙买加持续使用紧急状态（SOE）作为犯罪控制工具的原因，以及在拉丁美洲和加勒比地区（LAC）小型、低能力、竞争性民主国家中将这些措施正常化所带来的风险。我们将永久性国有企业问题视为法律问题，并且某些监管方法正在变得常态化。这与学者们将永久性国有企业视为法律或行政规则的中止，并明确区分法律与暴力、常态与紧急状态不同。我们的研究结果表明，牙买加持续使用国有企业反映出国家无力控制暴力犯罪，也反映出国家努力加强强制能力并弥补警察的低效。这也是对公众对国有企业监管需求的回应。国家的强化是建设更加和平、守法的社会的必要条件，但同时也是通过无视权利的治安带来民主退化风险的载体。尽管如此，我们看到对犯罪的专制管理总体上并未陷入专制主义，并且一些得到民间社会支持的国家监督机构进行了强有力的边界标记和巡逻。