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HOTT and heavy: higher-order thought theory and the theory-heavy approach to animal consciousness
Synthese ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 , DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04529-8
Jacob Berger , Myrto Mylopoulos

According to what Birch (2022) calls the theory-heavy approach to investigating nonhuman-animal consciousness, we select one of the well-developed theories of consciousness currently debated within contemporary cognitive science and investigate whether animals exhibit the neural structures or cognitive abilities posited by that theory as sufficient for consciousness. Birch argues, however, that this approach is in general problematic because it faces what he dubs the dilemma of demandingness—roughly, that we cannot use theories that are based on the human case to assess consciousness in nonhuman animals and vice versa. We argue here that, though this dilemma may problematize the application of many current accounts of consciousness to nonhuman animals, it does not challenge the use of standard versions of the higher-order thought theory (“HOTT”) of consciousness, according to which a creature is in a conscious mental state just in case it is aware of being in that state via a suitable higher-order thought (“HOT”). We show this in two ways. First, we argue that, unlike many extant theories of consciousness, HOTT is typically motivated by a commonsense, and more importantly, neutral condition on consciousness that applies to humans and animals alike. Second, we offer new empirical and theoretical reasons to think that many nonhuman animals possess the relevant HOTs necessary for consciousness. Considering these issues not only reveals the explanatory power of HOTT and some of its advantages over rival accounts, but also enables us to further extend and clarify the theory.



中文翻译:

HOTT 和沉重:高阶思想理论和动物意识的重理论方法

根据 Birch (2022) 所说的研究非人类动物意识的重理论方法,我们选择了当代认知科学中目前争论不休的一种成熟的意识理论,并研究动物是否表现出以下假设的神经结构或认知能力:该理论对于意识来说是足够的。然而,伯奇认为,这种方法总体上是有问题的,因为它面临着他所说的要求困境——粗略地说,我们不能使用基于人类案例的理论来评估非人类动物的意识,反之亦然。我们在这里认为,尽管这种困境可能会给许多当前的意识解释对非人类动物的应用带来问题,但它并没有挑战意识的高阶思想理论(“HOTT”)的标准版本的使用,根据该理论,生物处于有意识的精神状态,以防万一它通过适当的高阶思想(“HOT”)意识到处于该状态。我们以两种方式展示这一点。首先,我们认为,与许多现有的意识理论不同,HOTT 通常是由常识驱动的,更重要的是,意识的中性条件适用于人类和动物。其次,我们提供了新的经验和理论理由,认为许多非人类动物拥有意识所需的相关 HOT。考虑这些问题不仅揭示了 HOTT 的解释力及其相对于竞争对手帐户的一些优势,而且使我们能够进一步扩展和澄清该理论。

更新日期:2024-03-14
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