This paper investigates regulatory avoidance in the context of private country-by-country reporting (CbCR) introduced as part of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative. The reporting framework requires multinational companies above a revenue threshold to provide tax authorities with new and detailed information on their global activities, but the data are not made publicly available. I find robust evidence for an increase in mass below the revenue threshold after the introduction of CbCR in line with an avoidance response. Company types for which CbCR would imply relatively high costs including private companies or more tax-aggressive firms show a stronger avoidance response. The heterogeneities found can at least partially be explained by an analysis of increases in tax costs. The finding of regulatory avoidance of multinational enterprises in response to a fixed revenue threshold is of additional relevance in light of the international tax reform agenda which relies on similar thresholds.

本文研究了作为 OECD/G20 BEPS 倡议的一部分引入的私营国别报告 (CbCR) 背景下的监管规避情况。该报告框架要求收入门槛以上的跨国公司向税务机关提供有关其全球活动的新的详细信息，但这些数据并未公开。我发现了强有力的证据表明，在引入 CbCR 后，与回避反应一致的质量增加低于收入阈值。CbCR 意味着成本相对较高的公司类型（包括私营公司或更具税收侵略性的公司）表现出更强的避税反应。所发现的异质性至少可以部分地通过对税收成本增加的分析来解释。鉴于国际税收改革议程依赖于类似的门槛，跨国企业针对固定收入门槛进行监管规避的发现具有额外的相关性。