A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the principal's optimal delegation set. This set features a cap on high decisions and a gap around the agent's ex ante favorite decision. The set may even induce ex-post Pareto-dominated decisions. Under certain conditions on the cost of information acquisition, we show that the principal prefers delegating to an agent with a small bias than to an unbiased agent.

中文翻译：

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从偏见中受益：授权鼓励信息获取

委托人将决策委托给有偏见的代理人。收益取决于委托人无法观察到的状态。最初，智能体不会观察状态，但他可以以一定的成本获取有关状态的信息。我们描述委托人的最佳委托集。该集合的特点是对高决策有上限，并且在代理人事前最喜欢的决策周围存在差距。该集合甚至可能引发事后帕累托主导的决策。在信息获取成本的某些条件下，我们表明委托人更愿意委托给具有较小偏见的代理人，而不是委托给无偏见的代理人。