Consistent with the existing evidence from single-country studies, our difference-in-differences estimation finds a negative effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) provisions on labor productivity in a sample of member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Our study is distinct, however, in that we provide empirical evidence on why EPL reduces labor productivity, which has different practical implications. The negative effect is more pronounced among firms domiciled in countries with weaker investor protection, less developed takeover markets, and weaker employee incentives to work hard, those in industries with less intense competition, those that suffer from more severe agency problems, and those that have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity. These results suggest that the firm-employee agency conflict is the channel through which employment protection legislation reduces labor productivity.

中文翻译：

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全球就业保护、公司治理和劳动生产率

与单国研究的现有证据一致，我们的双重差分估计发现，就业保护立法（EPL）条款对经济合作与发展组织成员国样本的劳动生产率产生了负面影响（经合组织）。然而，我们的研究与众不同，因为我们提供了关于 EPL 为什么会降低劳动生产率的经验证据，这具有不同的实际意义。对于投资者保护较弱、收购市场较不发达、员工努力工作的激励较弱的国家、竞争不那么激烈的行业、代理问题较严重的国家以及那些存在较严重代理问题的国家的公司来说，负面影响更为明显。较低的绩效薪酬敏感性。这些结果表明，企业与雇员的代理冲突是就业保护立法降低劳动生产率的渠道。