Involution now refers to the phenomenon that competitors in the same field make more efforts to struggle for limited resources but get lower individual “profit effort ratio”. In this work, we investigate the evolution of the involution game when competitors in the same field can adopt not only the strategy of making more efforts but also a specialization strategy which allows competitors to devote all their efforts to part of the competitive field. Based on the existing model, we construct the involution game with the specialization strategy and simulate the evolution of it on a square lattice under different social resource, allocation parameter (characterizing the intensity of social competition), effort and other conditions. In addition, we also conduct a theoretical analysis to further understand the underlying mechanism of our model and to avoid illusive results caused by the model settings. Our main results show that, when the total effort of the specialization strategy and the ordinary strategy is equal, the group composed of all the agents has a certain probability to choose the ordinary strategy if the allocation parameter is very large (that is to say, the intensity of competition is very weak), otherwise the group will choose the specialization strategy; when the total effort of the two strategies is not equal, the proportion of the specialization strategy adoption is related to the social resource, the effort and the allocation parameter. To some extent, our study can explain why division of labor appears in human society and provide suggestions for individuals on competition strategy selection and governments on competition policy development.

内卷化现在是指同一领域的竞争者为争夺有限的资源而付出更多的努力，但个体“利润努力比”却较低的现象。在这项工作中，我们研究了当同一领域的竞争者不仅可以采取更加努力的策略，而且可以采取允许竞争者将所有努力投入到部分竞争领域的专业化策略时，内卷博弈的演化。基于现有模型，构建具有专业化策略的内卷博弈，并在方格上模拟不同社会资源、分配参数（表征社会竞争强度）、努力程度等条件下的内卷博弈演化。此外，我们还进行了理论分析，以进一步理解模型的底层机制，避免模型设置导致的错误结果。我们的主要结果表明，当专业化策略和普通策略的总努力相等时，如果分配参数很大（也就是说，竞争强度很弱），否则集团会选择专业化战略；当两种策略的总努力不相等时，专业化策略的采用比例与社会资源、努力和分配参数有关。我们的研究在一定程度上可以解释人类社会为何出现分工，为个人的竞争策略选择和政府的竞争政策制定提供建议。