Creative tools on content platforms significantly increase content quantity by reducing entry barriers. However, tools such as TikTok video templates primarily facilitate the production of relatively lower‐quality content, negatively impacting content quality due to creative limitations and style uniformity. Why do some platforms develop these tools while others do not? We develop a game‐theoretic model with monopoly and duopoly scenarios to investigate platform investment decisions concerning these special tools. We find that a platform is only incentivized to invest in facilitating low‐quality content production when the entry barrier is low. Additionally, the investment level may not decrease as users increasingly value high‐quality content. In the duopoly case, platforms may adopt differentiated strategies to mitigate direct competition, especially when users substantially value high‐quality content compared with low‐quality content.

中文翻译：

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平台投资与创作者品质选择

内容平台上的创意工具通过降低进入门槛显着增加内容数量。然而，TikTok 视频模板等工具主要促进了质量相对较低的内容的制作，由于创意限制和风格统一，对内容质量产生了负面影响。为什么有些平台开发这些工具，而另一些平台则不开发？我们开发了一个具有垄断和双头垄断场景的博弈论模型，以研究有关这些特殊工具的平台投资决策。我们发现，只有当进入门槛较低时，平台才会有动力投资于促进低质量内容的生产。此外，随着用户越来越看重优质内容，投资水平可能不会下降。在双头垄断的情况下，平台可能会采取差异化策略来减轻直接竞争，特别是当用户非常看重高质量内容而不是低质量内容时。