Innovation is a key driver of firm success. To encourage innovation, firms often offer equity‐based compensation, such as stock options, to better align CEOs' personal interests with shareholder value. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that stock options may not always benefit a firm by encouraging innovation. Instead, we demonstrate that CEOs intending to exercise their stock options have the incentive to be myopic in R&D management so that they can temporarily boost the stock price and, thus, increase their personal wealth. Using a unique multi‐source dataset of 335 Standard & Poor 500 companies from 2007 to 2015, we find evidence supporting this argument. Moreover, the findings suggest that factors that can affect the perceived pressure to promote innovation by CEOs might reshape the association between stock option exercise and myopic R&D management. For example, power resulting from CEO duality decreases the perceived pressure to promote innovation, which increases the likelihood of CEOs engaging in myopic R&D management when exercising their stock options. However, when shareholders present a long investment horizon or when firms have high innovativeness, CEOs perceive more pressure to promote innovation and thus are less likely to opt for myopic R&D management while exercising stock options. The findings provide important insights for better understanding and controlling managerial myopia in innovation management.

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创新动力太多？ CEO股票期权行使和短视的研发管理

创新是企业成功的关键驱动力。为了鼓励创新，公司通常提供基于股权的薪酬，例如股票期权，以更好地将首席执行官的个人利益与股东价值结合起来。根据代理理论，我们认为股票期权可能并不总是通过鼓励创新而使公司受益。相反，我们证明，打算行使其股票期权的首席执行官有动机在研发管理上变得短视，这样他们就可以暂时推高股价，从而增加个人财富。使用 2007 年至 2015 年 335 家标准普尔 500 强公司的独特多源数据集，我们找到了支持这一论点的证据。此外，研究结果表明，影响首席执行官促进创新的感知压力的因素可能会重塑股票期权行使与短视研发管理之间的关联。例如，首席执行官双重性带来的权力降低了促进创新的感知压力，这增加了首席执行官在行使股票期权时参与短视研发管理的可能性。然而，当股东投资期限较长或企业创新能力较高时，首席执行官会感受到更大的推动创新的压力，因此在行使股票期权时不太可能选择短视的研发管理。这些发现为更好地理解和控制创新管理中的管理短视提供了重要的见解。