The literature featuring game–theoretical models aimed at explaining the effect of the status concerns on the voluntary provision of a public good is generally focused on snob agents, driven by a desire for exclusiveness. However, the social context literature highlights that status concerns can give rise to a desire, in some individuals to be different from the “common herd,” and in some others to conform with other people. We analyze a two‐player public good game under two different settings: The standard case with two positional players (PPs), versus the case in which the positional player faces a conformist player (PC). Giving entrance to conformism has two main implications. Strong status concerns by both players can lead to a virtuous cycle in which the conformist player wishes to imitate the contributing behavior of the positional player, and the latter wishes to increase contribution to distinguish herself from the former. Then, the contribution to the public good can be higher than in the case with only snob agents. This higher contribution can increase social welfare, but only if endowments are not too large and the status concern of the positional player is not excessively high.

中文翻译：

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自愿提供公共物品中的地位效应和顺从效应

以博弈论模型为特色的文献旨在解释地位问题对自愿提供公共物品的影响，这些文献通常都集中在势利小人身上，他们受到排他性欲望的驱使。然而，社会背景文献强调，对地位的关注可能会引起一些人渴望与“大众”不同，而另一些人则渴望与其他人保持一致。我们在两种不同的设置下分析了双人公益博弈： 具有两个位置玩家的标准情况（PPs），与位置球员面对顺从球员（PC）的情况相比。允许墨守成规有两个主要含义。双方玩家对地位的强烈关注可以导致良性循环，其中顺从玩家希望模仿位置玩家的贡献行为，而后者希望增加贡献以区别于前者。那么，对公共利益的贡献可能会高于只有势利代理人的情况。这种较高的贡献可以增加社会福利，但前提是捐赠不是太大并且位置球员的地位关注不是太高。