Abstract

We argue that two well-known examples (strawberry distribution and Konigsberg bridges) generally considered genuine cases of distinctively mathematical explanation can also be understood as cases of distinctively generic explanation. The latter answer resemblance questions (e.g., why did neither person A nor B manage to cross all bridges) by appealing to ‘generic task laws’ instead of mathematical necessity (as is done in distinctively mathematical explanations). We submit that distinctively generic explanations derive their explanatory force from their role in ontological unification. Additionally, we argue that distinctively generic explanations are better seen as standardly mathematical instead of distinctively mathematical. Finally, we compare and contrast our proposal with the work of Christopher Pincock on abstract explanations in science and the views of Michael Strevens on abstract causal event explanations.

中文翻译：

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对物理事实的独特通用解释

摘要

我们认为，两个众所周知的例子（草莓分布和柯尼斯堡桥）通常被认为是独特数学解释的真实案例，也可以被理解为独特通用解释的案例。后者通过诉诸“通用任务定律”而不是数学必然性（正如在独特的数学解释中所做的那样）来回答相似性问题（例如，为什么人 A 和 B 都没有设法跨越所有桥梁）。我们认为，独特的通用解释的解释力来自于它们在本体论统一中的作用。此外，我们认为，独特的通用解释最好被视为标准数学，而不是独特的数学。最后，我们将我们的建议与克里斯托弗·平考克（Christopher Pincock）关于科学抽象解释的工作以及迈克尔·斯特文斯（Michael Strevens）关于抽象因果事件解释的观点进行了比较和对比。