Abstract

In order to explain that sentences containing empty definite descriptions are nevertheless true or false, Russell famously analyzes sentences of the form ‘The F is G’ as ‘There is exactly one F and it is G’. Against this it has been objected that Russell’s analysis provides the wrong truth-conditions when it comes to non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. For example, according to Heim, Kripke, and Elbourne (HKE), there are circumstances in which (1) is true and (2) is false.

1. Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.

2. Hans wants there to be exactly one ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet tonight.

After all, the argument goes, unlike (2), (1) can be true without Hans wanting there to be exactly one ghost in his attic. Kaplan and Neale famously reply that the HKE objection presupposes that non-doxastic attitudes are closed under entailment, which they are not. For Rostworowski, on the other hand, the problematic principle used by the HKE objection is a substitutivity principle for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. This is further supported by the fact that, as Elbourne points out, Russell’s analysis already leads to a problem similar to the HKE objection together with substitutivity alone. By questioning substitutivity for non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, Rostworowski tries to block both the HKE objection and Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection. In this paper, I will argue that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions leads to a variant of the HKE objection even in the context of doxastic attitude ascriptions. Since, as we will see, doxastic attitude ascriptions do not seem to suffer from the substitutivity problems discussed by Rostworowski in the context of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions, this will further exacerbate the problem for Russell’s analysis. I will then discuss the possibility to reject substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions using a contextualist analysis of attitude ascriptions. However, we will see that, independent of whether we accept substitutivity for doxastic attitude ascriptions, a complete solution of the doxastic problem has to reject Russell’s analysis of the truth-conditions of sentences of the form ‘The F is G’. Concluding, I will show that, unlike Russell’s analysis, the Frege–Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, according to which a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ presupposes that there is exactly one F, rather than asserting it, provides an explanation of the HKE objection, Elbourne’s variant of the HKE objection, and the doxastic problem presented in this paper. This will speak not only in favor of a Fregean analysis of definite descriptions, but also of a Fregean conception of propositions.

中文翻译：

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态度归因：罗素描述理论的新老问题

摘要

为了解释包含空的明确描述的句子是真是假，罗素将“The F is G”形式的句子分析为“恰好有一个F，它是G”。对此，有人提出反对，认为罗素的分析在涉及非信仰态度归因时提供了错误的真理条件。例如，根据 Heim、Kripke 和 Elbourne ( HKE ) 的观点，在某些情况下 (1) 为真，而 (2) 为假。

1. 汉斯希望阁楼里的鬼魂今晚保持安静。

2. 汉斯希望他的阁楼里只有一个鬼魂，并且今晚要安静。

毕竟，与（2）不同，（1）可以为真，而汉斯并不希望他的阁楼里只有一个鬼魂。卡普兰和尼尔的著名回答是，HKE 的反对意见预设了非信仰态度是封闭在蕴涵之下的，但事实并非如此。另一方面，对于 Rostworowski 来说，HKE反对意见所使用的有问题的原则是非信仰态度归因的替代性原则。正如埃尔伯恩指出的那样，罗素的分析已经导致了与HKE反对意见以及单独的替代性类似的问题，这一事实进一步支持了这一点。通过质疑非信仰态度归因的替代性，罗斯托沃夫斯基试图阻止HKE反对意见和埃尔本的HKE反对意见变体。在本文中，我将论证罗素对明确描述的分析导致了HKE反对意见的一种变体，即使是在信仰态度归因的背景下。正如我们将看到的，由于信念态度归因似乎并未受到罗斯托沃夫斯基在非信念态度归因背景下讨论的替代性问题的影响，这将进一步加剧罗素分析中的问题。然后，我将讨论使用态度归因的语境主义分析来拒绝信仰态度归因的替代性的可能性。然而，我们将看到，无论我们是否接受信念态度归因的替代性，信念问题的完整解决方案都必须拒绝罗素对“The F is G”形式的句子的真值条件的分析。最后，我将表明，与罗素的分析不同，弗雷格-斯特劳森对明确描述的分析，根据该分析，形式为“F是G”的句子预设了恰好有一个F，而不是断言它，提供了一种解释HKE反对意见、Elbourne 的HKE反对意见变体以及本文提出的信念问题。这不仅支持弗雷格对明确描述的分析，而且支持弗雷格的命题概念。