当前位置: X-MOL 学术Econ. Lett. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Condorcet-loser dominance between the plurality rule and other scoring rules
Economics Letters ( IF 1.469 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-13 , DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111652
Ryoga Doi , Noriaki Okamoto

In a voting model with three alternatives, we show that for any non-Borda scoring rule, there exists at least one preference profile under which the scoring rule selects a Condorcet loser, whereas the plurality rule does not.

中文翻译:

多数规则与其他评分规则之间的孔多塞失败者优势

在具有三种备选方案的投票模型中,我们表明,对于任何非博达评分规则,至少存在一个偏好配置文件,在该偏好配置文件下,评分规则选择孔多塞失败者,而多数规则则不然。
更新日期:2024-03-13
down
wechat
bug