We reexamine core-stability, incorporating inequality-averse preferences and challenging the conventional core’s stability under such preferences. We integrate existing social preferences tied to inequality aversion into a cooperative game model with transferable utility (TU games), introducing a novel core. We characterize the new core through inequalities akin to the “coalitional rationality” in TU games and conduct a comparative statics analysis on two parameters–envy and sympathy–representing inequality aversion. Our findings reveal that an increase in the envy parameter reduces elements in the new core, while heightened sympathy does not consistently decrease core elements.

中文翻译：

---

厌恶不平等效用函数下的核心分析

我们重新审视核心稳定性，纳入厌恶不平等的偏好，并挑战这种偏好下传统核心的稳定性。我们将现有的与不平等厌恶相关的社会偏好整合到具有可转让效用的合作博弈模型（TU 游戏）中，引入了一个新颖的核心。我们通过类似于 TU 博弈中“联盟理性”的不平等来表征新核心，并对代表不平等厌恶的两个参数——嫉妒和同情——进行了比较静态分析。我们的研究结果表明，嫉妒参数的增加会减少新核心中的元素，而同情心的增加并不会始终减少核心元素。