The formal recycling of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has long faced collection difficulties owing to the inadequate recycling system and insufficient collection capacity under China’s fund-based recycling model. The government has introduced the recycling Target Responsibility System (TRS) to motivate producers to develop and share recycling systems, yet without clear incentive mechanisms. In this study, we provide a “1 + N” shared recycling model referring to the theory of the sharing economy, and we propose a credit mechanism with a deposit system and a penalty mechanism for dishonesty to constrain the opportunistic behavior of sharing. In addition, according to the TRS, we design a “reduction-penalty-subsidy” fund policy to incentivize producers and recyclers to achieve recycling targets. On this basis, we apply evolutionary game theory and system dynamics approach to analyze the collaborative mechanism of shared recycling and the incentive effect of the funding policy. Game analysis yields the evolution of shared recycling from the developing stage to the mature stage. The system simulation results indicate that the government’s “penalty” and “subsidy” strategies provide evident incentives for producers and recyclers, respectively, in the developing stage, whereas endogenous dynamics derived from economies of scale under market mechanisms promote the multi-agent collaborative implementation of shared recycling in the mature stage.

由于我国基金回收模式下的回收体系不完善、收集能力不足，废弃电器电子设备（WEEE）的正规回收长期以来一直面临着收集困难。政府引入了回收目标责任制（TRS），以激励生产商开发和共享回收系统，但没有明确的激励机制。在本研究中，我们借鉴共享经济的理论，提出了“1+N”的共享回收模型，并提出了包含押金制度的信用机制和失信惩罚机制来约束共享的机会主义行为。此外，根据TRS，我们设计了“减量-处罚-补贴”的资金政策，以激励生产者和回收者实现回收目标。在此基础上，运用演化博弈论和系统动力学方法分析共享回收的协同机制和资助政策的激励效果。博弈分析得出共享回收从发展阶段到成熟阶段的演变过程。系统模拟结果表明，在发展阶段，政府的“惩罚”和“补贴”策略分别为生产者和回收者提供了明显的激励，而市场机制下规模经济产生的内生动力促进了多主体协同实施共享回收处于成熟阶段。