There are three views of cognitive representation: the amodal, strong-embodiment, and weak-embodiment views of cognition. The present research provides support for the weak-embodiment view by demonstrating that two representational systems, one conceptual and one perceptual, underlie the cognitive processing of sensory experiences. We find that an initial sensory experience can exert two independent influences on judgments about a subsequent sensory experience. Specifically, we show that the representation of an initial sensory experience creates an expectation that biases judgments of the subsequent experience toward the initial experience (i.e., an assimilation bias), while the representation of an initial sensory experience creates a comparison standard that biases judgments of the subsequent experience away from the initial experience (i.e., a contrast bias). Documenting concurrent assimilation and contrast biases supports the claim of a dual representational system espoused by the weak-embodiment view. In so doing, we update the classic literature on context effects and contribute to the debate on representational systems in cognition.

中文翻译：

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感官体验的不可还原性：双重表征导致双重情境偏差

认知表征存在三种观点：非模态认知观、强具体化认知观和弱具体化认知观。本研究通过证明两种表征系统（一种是概念性的，一种是感知性的）是感官体验的认知处理的基础，为弱具体化观点提供了支持。我们发现，初始感官体验可以对后续感官体验的判断产生两种独立的影响。具体来说，我们表明，初始感官体验的表征创建了一种期望，使后续体验的判断偏向于初始体验（即同化偏差），而初始感官体验的表征创建了一个比较标准，使后续体验的判断出现偏差。随后的体验远离最初的体验（即对比偏差）。记录同时存在的同化和对比偏差支持了弱体现观点所拥护的双重表征系统的主张。通过这样做，我们更新了关于情境效应的经典文献，并为认知表征系统的辩论做出了贡献。